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This article searches for a theoretical framework that could specifically 
incorporate the experience of the oppressed. After reviewing the feminist critiques 
of historical materialism within the context of standpoint theory, and after 
analyzing Third-world perspectives on oppression, it argues that rather than post- 
modernism, a new historical materialism which incorporates the subject's 
experience into its analysis of social structure could generate such a theoretical 
framework. 
Within the context of historical materialism, even though Marx and Engels' 
arguments on class oppression have always been informed by historical conditions, 
most of the subsequent Marxist analysis has abstracted itself from the societal 
. . experience.. In the sociological~explanations provided, structural determinants 
often overshadowed social agency. The seminal work in this tradition is that of 
Barrington Moore Jr. (1967) on the social origins of dictatorship and democracy 
which highlights the structural patterns in societies that generate different 
political outcomes. The works of sociologists such as Theda Skocpol (1978), Ellen 
Trimberger (1978): Jack Goldstone (:991j, Rogers Brubaker (1992) closely follow 
and replicate the structural elements of Moore's model. Yet this model's 
conception epistemologically favors structure over agency. This critique becomes 
more evident when one considers the alternate approach as formulated by E. P. 
Thompson in his seminal work (1963) on the making of the English working class 
where he explicitly criticizes the structuralist approaches and, in order to capture 
agency, bases his alternate conception specifically on the historical experience of 
the worker. Subsequent works by scholars such as William Sewell, Jr .  (1980, 
1985), b n  Arninzade (1981), Howard Kirneldorf (1988) and Sonya Rose (1992) 
further articulate the agency of social actors through in-depth historical- 
sociological analysis. The structural tendency to overlook the agency of social 
actors is thus offset by the interpretive emphasis on the historical experience. 
Yet, two questions still remain: First, how analytically rigorous is the 
category of experience as a sociological concept? And second, how can one capture, 
in addition to workers and women, the experience of oppressed groups such as 
racial and ethnic minorities, and the Third-world people? These two questions 
first lead us to study the use of the category of experience within the context of 
class formation (Thompson 1963) and of gender analysis (Smith 1992, 1990, 1989, 
1987). We are then alerted to the continuities in the Third-world experience of 
oppression. Possible theoretical solutions to the incorporation into sociological 
theory of the category of experience steer us to postmodernism and to a new 
historical materialism. The article argues that a reinterpretation of historical 
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*2:. -..% . materialism from the viewpoint of the subject's experience of the social structure 
may capture the analytical rigor of both social structure and the subsequent social 
action. 
i- 
From Historical Materialism to the Worker's Experience 
:*.: 
2 . .. ',. ' . - Marx and Engels' analysis of capitalism in Western Europe sum up the two . . 
original contributions of historical materialism to sociological. First, they carefully 
delineate how historical conditions determine social action and social structure to  
produce class opp'ression. Second, they hint on how social action, spearheaded by 
the oppressed proletariat, has the capacity to transform social structure. 
Subsequent Marxist analyses have based their interpretations solely on the 
abstractions Marx and Engels made at the level of social action and social 
structure. These analyses have overlooked the historicity of Marx and Engels' 
analyses as well as the historicity of their own contemporary analytical 
frameworks. In their theory of class oppression, Marx and Engels were both 
constricted and empowered by the historical conditions of their social environment. 
The specific juncture of capitalist development, the workers' exploitation within 
the industrial structure, the political upheavals all combined to inform their 
theory. Similarly, subsequent Marxist analyses were very much influenced in 
their analyses with the international developments in capitalism, the worldwide' 
increase in worker's and the political dangers facing their societies. ' The extensive 
empirical analyses that Marx and Engels engaged in enabled them to utilize their 
historicities constructively. Yet the increased theoretical abstractions and 
generalizations of the subsequent Marxist analyses reduced their epistemological 
awareness of their historicities, namely the specific effect of the contemporary 
conditions on their own analytical frameworks. By obliterating historicity, Marxist 
analysis seems to have lost two crucial attributes: the agency of the oppressed 
- people embedded in their particular-historicities; and the compassion of the 
,, . ., . Marxist.scholars themselves embedded in their own contemporary world. 
Yet one perspective within Marxist analysis, the one I have termed 
"interpretivist,". was able to. sustain the original focus on historicity. It was in this 
context that E. P.-Thompson evolved the concept of the worker's experience in 
. . analyzing the problem.of class formation. He explicitly stated that (1963: 9) 
By class I understand an historical phenomenon, unifying a number of 
disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw 
material experience and in consciousness ... The notion of class entails 
the notion of historical relationship. Like any other relationship, it is 
a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead a t  any 
given moment and anatornise its structure ... The relationship must 
always be embodied in real people and a real context. 
Indeed, the determinacy of structure in sociological analysis could only be avoided 
by bringing in the temporality of events. And it is the emphasis on the experience 
of class that differentiates E. P. Thompson from his contemporaries. He 
. 
specifically argues (1963: 11) that "class is defined by men as they live their own 
history, and, in the end, this is the only definition." The most significant 
consequence of E. P. Thompson's approach for sociological analysis was thus the 
reinvigoration of the concept of agency. 
Yet how analytically rigorous was this alternative formulation in 
confronting the alternative ones which gave primacy to social structure in 
explaining social action? Indeed, even though the worker's experience successfully 
mediated between productive relations and class consciousness, the concept of 
experience itself was inadequately theorized. As Sewell has currently elaborated 
(1990: 59). E. P. Thompson's meaning of the term experience was "intrinsically 
amorphous," appearing to encompass both productive relations and class 
consciousness, the two terms between which it was supposed to mediate. Hence, 
in the end, the concept of experience failed this mediation by becoming an 
amorphous, all encompassing, totalizing concept with no analytical rigor. Sewell 
.-I I . - argues (1990: 70) that one also needs to take into account the "formal structure of 
the conceptual transformation" that preceded and shaped the experience. Hence 
one needs an account of structural dynamics as well as experiential moments in 
order to capture the entirety of the social experience. Have there been any 
, .  theoretical approaches that focused on experience and critically delved into its 
' . .-* - structural .- and practical determinants? It is in this context that feminist theory 
becomes crucially pertinent to sociological analysis. The feminist focus on the 
social construction of gender provides significant insights into the possible 
operationalization of the structural and practical determinants of the social 
experience. 
From the Worker's Experience to Gender:~oroth~ Smith, Sandra Harding 
and Patricia Hill Collins 
Feminist theory argues that in very significant ways, women's experience 
and the gender oppression on which it is based resembles the worker's experience 
and the class oppression within which that is embedded. Hence, through studying 
the feminist analyses on women's experience, we can gain additional insights into 
the sociological construction of'the concept of social experience. Also, the fact that 
feminists based their studies of gender oppression on Marxism enables us to 
recreate a new historical materialism that'takes into account the experience of the 
oppressed groups other than workers. l 
As feminists tried bring in the viewpoint of gender oppression to 
contemporary Marxist theory, however, they found its categories to be 
constricting. Such a constriction, many of them argued, was a recent phenomenon 
that did not exist at the original conception of historical materialism in late 
nineteenth century. They added that it was the more contemporary 
epistemological break between structuralisn~ and humanism within Marxist 
analysis that had-produced this outcome. Within the feminist discourse, two 
,:! -different explanations .on this perceived epistemological break emerged. One 
focused on the alternate visions of socialism within historical materialism that 
were then obliterated at the expense of.the structuralist vision. In order to 
encompass theFwomen's experience, Barbara Taylor's (1983) study of the Owenites 
attempted to resuscitate this humanistic vision. The other discourse engaged in an 
epistemological critique by analyzing how subsequent Marxist interpretations 
alienated the scholar from hisher text and destroyed the agency of the subjects. 
Dorothy Smith's works (1 990, 1989, 1987) in particular articulated this 
perspective so as to recapture social agency and, with it, the women's experience. 
Barbara Taylor's analysis of the relationship between socialism and 
feminism articulated how the Owenite strategy; which Marx and Engels rejected 
as socialist utopianism, indeed contained the humanistic perspective that historical 
materialism eventually lost. This was specifically evident in the Owenite critique 
One should note that Marx and Engels also studied patriarchal oppression within the 
context of the family. But their theorization of patriarchal oppression very much derived from 
their highly original class oppression analyses. 
of contemporary society which expanded beyond Marxism and class analysis to 
include, as social theorists now advocate, "all forms of social oppression, whether 
experienced in the workplace, marketplace, the school or the home" (Taylor 1983: 
21). According to this Owenite perspective, all human relations were to be 
reconstructed not on power, but instead on the emotional platform of love. In 
addition, once society was organized around human needs, women's physical 
disabilities were to be offset by social arrangements which gave them the 
maximum support. Hence this socialist perspective promised women a much more 
active participation in society; it proposed to build support networks for women 
that would eventually allow then1 to build an alternative formulatioil to 
L_ . .. - capitalism. In addition, it wanted to eliminate personal dependence in favor of the 
; communal unit upon which both men and women relied equally, thus indirectly 
obliterating the econonlic foundations of male domination (Taylor 1983: 37). This 
socialist vision that included women was abandoned for a more structuralist 
version by Marx and Engels who rejected "the Eden of socialist hope before the 
-- - 
. - a  
bitter apple of class warfare had matured" (Taylor 1983: xvii). 
Even though the historical conjuncture indeed forced Marx and Engels to 
make the choice of retaining the structuralist component of class analysis to the 
detriment of the humanistic one, subsequent Marxist analyses, by their very 
atemporal approaches to class oppression, persistently failed to reintroduce the 
humanistic component. Yet Taylor's historical analysis does not proceed to provide 
an alternate formulation that would overcome this shortcoming. It is only through 
Dorothy Smith's critical analyses of sociological epistemology that the foundation 
of such an alternate was laid. 
Dorothy Smith and Women's Experience Dorothy Smith has 
introduced two new concepts into the basic arguments of historical materialism: 
women's experience (to capture gender oppression) and ideological practice (to 
explain malevhegemony). Her attempts to rework historical materialism have led 
her to articulate the parallels between the experiences of women and the 
proletariat. She thus elaborated how ideological practice and social structure often 
interacted to produce and reproduce hegemony. Dorothy Smith's work was 
particularly seminal in the critique it provided of historical materialism. She 
argued that, in spite of her cutting commentary, that only historical materialism 
was epistemologically capable of analyzing gender oppression. 
Dorothy Smith commenced her critique of historical materialism by 
comparing the compassion in Marx and Engels's original writings with the 
contemporary dearth in Marxist scholarship. The empirical grounds for this 
comparison was: located in. her -own- personal experience. "When I was teaching a 
I course on2women :and.class a few.years ago," Smith stated, "I had this experience" 
We did a critical review of some of the major contemporary theorists 
of class, Olin Wright, Poulantzas, Carchedi and so forth. Then we 
read Marx and Engels' The Communist Manifesto. There was a 
startling difference. The latter locates the reader in the movement of 
history;-classes are not mapped out as a structure consistiilg of 
categories of persons or positions; the reading subject is located a t  a 
moment between a past, in which classes have arisen and that 
subjected society to their conditions of appropriation, and a future, in 
which the proletariat abolishes previous conditions of appropriation 
and thereby appropriation itself. Readers are placed pronominally; 
the bourgeoisie is directly addressed as an other, in opposition to the 
"we" situated on this side of the struggle, our side. "You are 
horrified," Marx and Engels write to that other subject, "at our 
intending to do away with private property." "You reproach us with 
intending to do away with property" and "that is what we intend." 
The irony is heavy here. The "you" and "yours" are the bourgeoisie, 
addressed directly. "We" are the communists whose position is stated 
in the Manifesto by the communist authors; "we" creates a position 
for the subject in the text that is home for whoever takes our side; 
"we" are placed by this textual act in the class struggle. 
Hence Dorothy Smith noted how Marx and Engels's original writings did not have 
the epistemological gap that had recently developed between the Marxist scholar 
and hislher analysis. One could still feel the passion that they felt for their subject 
and the cause. Yet claims of objectivity, generalizability, and theoretical 
abstraction had slowly forced this passion to ebb to the point that there was not 
spirit left but only bare structure. It was this ebbing passion, this sense of agency 
on the part of both the researcher and his\her subject, that Dorothy Smith tried to 
restore. 
In her work, Smith dramatically illustrated the extent of this disjuncture by 
directly confronting her reader in her narrative. As she stated (Smith 198913: 42): 
So here I am, and there you are, my reader. Here I am writing this 
in a third-floor room looking out at the large old maple tree (now 
dying from the effects of acid rain) that shades my attic in summer 
and half-hearing in the background on the radio the latest figures on 
unemployment in the United States. The linear text conceals my 
transition from cafe lunch to workroom. And you, wherever you are, 
are reading. There is a movement in time, I am writing now, you are 
reading then. I writing then and you reading now. The text lies 
between us, organizing our relation. 
Hence this textual organization constantly mediated the meanhg of social 
experience for the reader; sociology even deliberately arranged this mediation to  
distance the research from hisber subject so as to ensure "objectivity." Dorothy 
Smith thus dramatically accented these hidden arrangements by addressing her 
reader directly, making us once more conscious of the actual distance we place 
between ourselves as researchers and our subjects. I t  made apparent the degree 
to which sociologists, have, in the name of objectivity and moral distance from 
social phenomena, alienated themselves from the objects of their analyses2 
This alienation was further amplified by the plethora of texts that employed 
historical materialism. The increasing distance between sociologists and their 
subjects in the name of objectivity was further amplified by the vast number of 
Even though Smith points out the omnipotence of the text as the only mediator between 
the author and her audience, she nevertheless does not take the postmodern perspective which 
privileges the text over social structure and social action. 
texts that employed historical matxirialism only to further dilute its humanistic 
vision. As Dorothy Smith (1989a:45) put it: 
Contemporary .Marxist texts on class ... characteristically take 
advantage of the elaborate textual devices developed in the social 
sciences since Marx and Engels wrote. These constitute social and 
economic relations as if they went forward without the presence of 
actual subjects; characteristically they construct a temporal order that 
does not situate the reader in a historical trajectory from past t o  
.future; characteristically the reading and writing subjects, if they are 
explicitly present, are external to  the phenomenon of which the texts 
speak. 
Hence this alienation of Marxist scholars from their analyses was, for Dorothy 
Smith, the major cause of the current despiritedness in historical materialism. 
Ironically, it was the Marxist scholars themselves, who, while criticizing the 
, alienation of workers from their labor, ended up-removing themselves from their 
, % own labor and its products for society at  large. Because of this alienation, they fell 
instead into the vicious circle of reifying Marxist principles. Once in the circle, 
rather than destroying the existing power hegemony, Marxists scholars reproduced 
it instead. 
How could Marxist scholars recover their lost agency? Smith argues that 
the first step is to return to return to the original texts with the explicit aim to 
problematize the current interpretations. To illustrate her argument,3 she then 
reanalyzes Marx's German Ideology from the standpoint of her own experience as 
a woman and a Marxist scholar. Like the original Marx she is focusing on, 
Dorothy Smith asserts, we as sociologists should always focus on the direct 
experience rather than on the abstract social structure that often emerges from 
Marx's depictions. She constantly reiterates the chasm ,that has developed in 
materialist analysis between a social scientific concept and the actual activities i t  
Dorothy Smith specifically argues (1990b: 34) that Marx "proposes to ground social 
science in the activities of actual individuals and the material conditions thereof, more specifically 
in the forms of cooperation or social relations that arise from and organize their activities." 
expresses. Instead, she summarizes her position (1990b: 37-8) by quoting the 
German Ideology where Marx explicitly declared that "where speculation ends -- 
in real life -- there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical 
activity of men." It  is this reinterpretation of Marx that enables Dorothy Smith to 
bring in women's experience as the practical activity Marx pertains to, thereby 
extending the male experience Marx often focused on to cover that of the female. 
Yet why has the women's experience (and, we call add, for our own 
purposes, the experience of the oppressed) not led to their liberation from gender 
oppression? For Dorothy Smith, the key lies in the ideological practice of the 
relations of ruling that are contained in capitalism. She first defines relations of 
ruling as (1990a: 6) "the complex of extra-local relations that provide in 
contemporary societies a specialization of organization, control, and initiative. 
They are those forms that we know as bureaucracy, administration, management, 
professional organization, and the media -- even though they are for the most part 
textually mediated." These relations of ruling shape, and, in women's case, inhibit 
social action. She then locates the social origins of this inhibition in the practice of 
capitalism. Smith states that (1989a: 49) "capitalism breaks the integration of 
production and reproduction," thereby disadvantaging women. She elucidates this 
conjecture in an earlier piece where she suggests that (1987a: 5): 
Historically the organization of these relations (of ruling) and their 
dynamic expansion are intimately linked to the dynamic progress of 
capital. Capitalism creates a wholly new terrain of social relations 
external to the local terrain and the particularities of personally 
mediated economic and social relations. I t  creates an extralocal 
medium of action constituted by a market process in which a 
multiplicity of anonymous buyers and sellers interrelate and by an 
expanding arena of political activity. These extralocal, impersonal, 
universalized forms of action became the exclusive terrain of men, 
while women became correspondingly confined to a reduced local 
sphere of action organized by particularistic relationships. 
Subsequently, as capitalism represents the men's standpoint as universal, and as 
it gives more and more authority to the male voice, women become silenced and 
their experiences disregarded. 
Sociologists also inadvertently reproduce and enhance these silences as they 
use the biased concept of "objectivity" in their analyses of contemporary 
capitalism. Dorothy Smith specifically criticizes the scientific convention of 
"objectivity" that starts the sociological endeavor at  the level of social action, 
which is always assumed to be a "neutral" social fact. She argues, however, that 
social action is a socially preconstituted consequence of human experience, and 
therefore already partial to  gender. She dramatically explains (Smith 198913: 34) 
- how, as sociologists- write "the social illto .texts, .making them recognizable to 
- "readers as sociology and generating the phenomenal.words that.organize the 
multiple theoretical enclaves of the discourse," they end up unintentionally 
- recreating the relations of ruling that the -texts carry and transmit. What then 
one is to do to overcome this gender bias a t  the level of social action? Dorothy 
Smith-proposes that we as researchers focus on everyday occurrences such as 
factual accounts of mental illness, micro-politics of a meeting, and their sociological 
descriptions to critically decipher the relations of rulihg embedded within them.4 
According to  Dorothy Smith, only through bridging the epistemological 
divide in contemporary sociology between the experiences of the everyday world 
and larger institutional ideologies that sociology substitutes for "social facts" can 
we regenerate agency in sociological analysis in general, and in women's agency in 
One can argue that this extensive use of texts to demonstrate gender oppression is 
methodologically similar to postmodernism. Yet Smith does not agree with the postmodern reign 
of the text; she (1990a: 4-5) points out that the "ideology of postmodernism permanently seals off 
any attempt to find an escape hatch for inquiry beyond the textual surface of discourse." The 
standpoint of women (read women's experience embedded in social structure and ideological 
practice) provides such an escape hatch as the woman's experience returns her to the actualities 
of her life. 
particular. As the foundation of this new sociology, Smith proposes (1989b: 38) 
that we undertake "an insider's sociology;" this sociology works from the site of 
knowing (i.e., from experience) which precedes the differentiation of the subjective 
(action) and the objective (structure). Historical materialism still provides for her 
the analytical parameters of her approach, as the concept of class still captures for 
Dorothy Smith the actual organization of relations in which our lives are 
embedded. Yet she proposes to reposition Marx and Eagels's definition of class in 
order to overcome its historical specificity.5 What type of analysis would this 
repositioning of the Marxist scholar and the realignment of Marxist analysis lead 
.-,. to? The following blueprint sunlmarizes the main points of the new sociological 
.... .-Ti-?: -..,-. approach (1989a: 44-5): 
=: .* 
The text places the reader historically; class struggle is going on and 
ycu are in the middle of it. The sides are drawn up in the text itself 
as subjects are directly summoned and addressed. We can enter 
ourselves directly into its drama. Class is not objectified in the text 
-- as it is in the elaborate theoretical constructs of the contemporary Marxist theorists, needing rather careful fitting to the actualities of 
. --,, 
--a 
contemporary social relations. Rather, class emerges as a great 
historical process of struggle i n  which the pamphlet and its analysis 
- -* -* -. .  are situated. The time of the text is just exactly that hinge where the 
past turns on a present that will be making the future. This is where 
you, as reading subject, are placed in the pamphlet. The polemic of 
the text is a call on you to act at  precisely this juncture. But the 
temporal setting of reading and writing subjects in an historical 
trajectory of which the text itself is part isn't just a polemical effect. 
Though the reader isn't always being called on to act as he (I use the 
pronoun advisedly) is here, Marx and Engels' analyses generally have 
this historically situated character; the time of the text isn't separate 
from the historical time of which it speaks. 
What is most significant in the alternative political economy that Smith advocates 
here is her call for (1989a: 56) "an openness to the multiple sites of experience 
(including race, class and gender) in. contemporary capitalism and the evolution of 
a systematically developed social consciousness (a political economy, a sociology) 
She states (1989a: 56-7) that "nonetheless inheriting the tradition of analysis they 
founded, entering a t  a later stage the same historical trajectory, and caught up in the same 
historical struggles that they carried, (Marx and Engels') work is original and the model for ours." 
that does not depend upon collap'sing them into ;1 singleover-iidi6g standpoint." 
Yet, how to theoretically articulate these multiple sites of experience? One must 
note that, in a current issue of Sociological Theory, three scholars (Lemert 1992, 
Collins 1992, Connell 1992) identified the construction of the women's experience 
-- which Smith treats as a "natural knowing process" devoid of any social 
constraints -- as the main theoretical weakness of her model. Hence Dorothy 
Smith equips us with an insight but she does not fully articulate her alternative 
theoretical approach. For that, we need to turn to feminist theory which 
elaborates on the multiple sites of experience, particularly a t  the intersections of 
gender, class, and race. 
Sandra. Harding and. the Gender-Experience of Oppression The 
most analytically articulate theoretical-conception of the concept of social 
experience is contained in the "feminist standpoint theory" that Sandra Harding 
advocates in her works (1991, 1987a, 198713, 1986, 1975). By-drawing on the 
materialist analysis of the class~oppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie to 
outline .women's-oppression by men, Harding comes 'closest t o  critically 
reinterpreting Marxist analysis within feminist parameters.6 She terms this 
theoretical perspective, which is based on the premise that knowledge is socially 
situated, feminist standpoint theory because it approaches the construction of 
knowledge from the socially problematized vantage point of the actors that are 
Harding also outlines and analyzes two other feminist epistemological programs, namely 
feminist empiricist philosophy which tries to correct "bad science," and feminist postmodernism 
which is "suspicious of the Enlighknment loyalties inherent in such scientific and epistemological 
projects" (Harding 1991: vii). Feminist empiricists specifically argue (Harding 1987a: 182-3) 
"that sexist and androcentric biases are eliminable by stricter adherence to the existing 
methodological norms of scientific inquiry, that the context of discovery is just a s  important as the 
context of justification for eliminating social biases that contribute to partial and distorted 
explanations and understandings, and that women (or feminists, male and female) as  a group are 
more likely than men (nonfeminists) as  a group to produce claims unbiased by androcentrism, and 
in that sense objective results of inquiry." With respect to feminist postmodernism, Harding 
argues specifically that although -feminist postmodernists sensitize us to multiple realities, they do 
not guide us with a clearly defined research agenda. 
engaged in the process. Dorothy Smith, Nancy Kartsock (1987), Hilary Rose 
(1983), and Sandra Harding herself are then identified as the main proponents of 
this theory. 
Sandra Harding explicitly traces the origins of this perspective to Marxist 
analysis as she notes that (1991: 120): 
This justificatory approach originates in Hegel's insight into the 
relationship between the master and the slave and the development 
of Hegel's perceptions into the "proletarian standpoint" by Marx, 
Engels, and Georg Lukacs. The assertion is that human activity, or 
"material life," not only structures but sets limits on human 
understanding: what we do shapes and constrains what we can know. 
Once subjects thus recapture their agency through bringing in their standpoints, 
through acknowledging the social situatedness, i.e., historicity, of their beliefs, 
-. - 
.-I, ,k 
their ensuing analysis produces less partial and less distorted interpretations of 
-7 " - social experience. This formulatioil is contrary to the norms of objectivity 
advocated by the scientific method; feminist standpoint theorists argue instead 
-3,- L7 
(Harding 1987a: 185) that research directed by social values and political agendas 
& FZ 
lrC- produce empirically preferable results of research. Hence, the argument continues, 
-- the subject of liberatory feminist knowledge ought to be explicitly multiple, 
contradictory (in the Marxian sense), and the subject of every other liberatory 
knowledge project. In actualizing this aspiration, Sandra Harding suggests that 
we employ Marxism as a model, but only after replacing the proletariat by women 
or feminists as the potentially ideal agents of knowledge. She points out that 
Marxism reformulated (the) Enlightenment vision so that the ' 
proletariat, guided by Marxist theory and by class struggle, became 
the ideal knowers, the group capable of using observation and reason 
to grasp the true form of social relations, including our relations with 
nature. This Marxist successor to bourgeois science was, like its 
predecessor, to provide one social group -- here, the proletariat -- with 
the knowledge and power to lead the rest of the species toward 
emancipation. Marxism's epistemology is grounded in a theory of 
labor rather than a theory of innate (masculine) faculties; so just as 
not all human faculties are equal in the bourgeois version, here not 
all labor is equal. I t  was through struggle in the workplace that the 
proletariat would generate knowledge. In neither socialist practice 
nor Marxist theory were any women ever conceptualized as 
fundamentally defined by their relation to the mode of 
production.. .The (standpoint feminist epistemology) is grounded in a 
successor theory of labor, or rather, of distinctively human activity, 
and seek to substitute women or feminists (the accounts differ) for the 
proletariat as the potentially ideal agents of knowledge. 
This rendering fully explicates how standpoint theory picks up where Marxist 
analysis has left. 
Nancy Hartsock further elaborates on how standpoint theory should draw 
upon the experiences of the proletariat "to understand phallocratic domination." 
It is only by drawing upon the analytically rigorous explanation of class oppression 
can we start to comprehend gender oppression. She specifically argues that (198'7: 
(L)ike the lives oftthe proletarians according to Marxian theory, 
women's lives make available a particular and privileged vantage 
point on male supremacy, a vantage point which can ground a 
powerful critique of the phallocratic institutions and ideology which 
constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy ... the sexual division of 
labor forms the basis of such a standpoint and ... on the basis of the 
structures which define women's activity as contributors to 
subsistence and as mothers one could begin, though not complete, the 
construction of such an epistemological tool.. .Just as Marx's 
understanding of the world from the standpoint of the proletariat 
enabled him to go beneath bourgeois ideology, so a feminist 
standpoint can allow us to understand patriarchal institutions and 
ideologies as perverse inversions of more humane relations. 
Hence humane relations once more come to the forefront of the feminist 
reinterpretation of Marxist analysis. This reinterpretation does indeed bring 
historical materialism into the twentieth century as women replace the proletariat 
as the possible vanguards of the new order. Yet, given the power inequalities that 
still persist among women and across the world, we still need to further 
reinterpret Marxist analysis for the twenty-first century: we can only do so by 
bringing in all the dispossessed -- including the materially, sexually, and regionally 
dispossessed -- to be the pioneers of a liberatory new order. 
In her most recent work, Sandra Harding does indeed pay particular 
attention to the African American and Third World criticisms of the feminist 
discourse. She argues that we need to study in more depth how "the development 
of Western sciences and models of knowledge are embedded in and have advanced 
the development of Western society but have also led t o  the simultaneous de- 
development and continual re-creation of 'others' -- third world peoples, women, 
the poor, nature" (Harding 1991: ix). She then proceeds t o  elaborate on her 
approach by pointing out that only through bringing in the standpoints of the 
oppressed and the  dispossessed, only by taking (Harding 1991: x) "the standpoint 
of the lives of groups that have not been central to Western feminist discussions of 
science and epistemology (let alone dominant discourses). . . (can) liberatory 
movements hasten the 'birthing' of new agents of history and knowledge." Hence 
Harding expands the feminist standpoint to the "others," as she defines them. 
Yet is such a declaration sufficient? Harding's discussion of the others' 
standpoints does not progress beyond her solemn advice to First-world white 
femir~ists that they give space to the standpoints of the others. She merely states 
that "it is necessary to decenter white, middle-class, heterosexual, Western women 
in Western feminist thought and yet still generate feminist analyses from the 
perspective of women's lives" (Harding 1991: 13). The assumption hidden here is 
that once we can detect, in scientific practice, the androcentric or Eurocentric 
beliefs and practices as part of evidence for one hypothesis over another, then we 
can automatically eliminate them. Dorothy Smith (1987b: 86) engages in the 
same wishful thinking7 when she asserts that the unequal relationship between 
Although I must say that Dorothy Smith admits that this consequence is possible, but 
not inevitable. She explicitly states that (1987b: 86): 
(T)he institutions which lock sociology into the structures occupied by men are the 
same institutions which lock women into the situations in which they find 
the two worlds and the two bases of knowledge and experience, that of sociology 
' 
versus that of women's everyday experience, would unravel as soon as the 
institutions that produce this inequality are identified. Hence, once more, feminist 
standpoint theory seems to assume that when we understand and unearth the 
inequality, we automatically become empowered to eliminate it. But the 
elimination process is not that simple. The critical works of Black feminists and 
Third-world writers caution us not to  share the optimism of Dorothy Smith and 
Sandra Harding; these works depict, time and again, the persistence of such 
hegemonies, of structures of domination, long after their successful identification 
by the oppressed groups. 
Patricia Hill Collins and the Articulation of the Matrix of Oppression 
: - 2  The critique by nlinority women of the insights provided by feminist theory 
revolves around the issue of power, in this case power associated with white, 
heterosexual, middle-class women at  the expense of "other" women. Indeed, the 
minority feminist perspective problematizes the intersection of gender, class and 
- race. It demonstrates;in particular, how ideological practice and social structure 
combine to produce the triple oppression of poor, non-white women. Black 
feminists8 in particular utilize the feminist standpoint theory to study how this 
triple oppression works in the contemporary U.S. society. Patricia Collins (1991) 
and bell hooks (1989) develop a matrix of domination whereby, in the case of 
Black women, race, class and gender emerge as the three systems of oppression 
that most heavily affect them. bell hooks (1989: 175) refers to this matrix of 
themselves oppressed. To 'unlock the latter leads logically to an unlocking of the 
former. 
Patricia Collins states, for example, how significant this theory was for her to establish 
her agency as a Black woman in a society that totally segregated her. Through the standpoint 
theory, she was able to unite her experience with those of other Black women. So, she states 
(1991: xii) that "the voice (she) now seeks is both individual and collective, personal and political, 
one reflecting the intersection of (her) unique biography with the larger meaning of (her) historical 
times. " 
domination as "the ideological ground that the (dominant) share, which is a belief 
in domination, a belief in the notions of superior and inferior, which are the 
components of all those systems." Collins further articulates these multiple levels 
of domination when she states that (1991: 227): 
People experience and resist oppression on three levels: the level of 
personal biography; the group or community level of the cultural 
context created by race, class, and gender; and the systemic level of 
social institutions. Black feminist thought emphasizes all three levels 
as sites of domination and as potential sites of resistance. 
Modes of resisting the matrix of domination is what Collins elaborates upon in her 
work. "For the African-American women," she argues (1 991: lo), "the knowledge 
gained a t  the intersection of race, gender, and class oppression provides the 
-- 
SkS" 
stimulus for crafting and passing on the subjugated knowledge of a Black women's 
'e 
-% 
culture of resistance. " For Collins, Afrocentric consciousness, though inadequately 
elaborated, is the result of this self-conscious, self-defined struggle. And it is this 
- 
.* * 
self-defined standpoint that stimulates resistance among the oppressed group of 
--- 
.%. 
Black women in particular, and other oppressed groups in general. Hence, the 
"3% - 3 analyses of Black women introduce, for the first time, into feminist theory the 
concept of empowerment through resistance. Patricia Hill Collins also strives for a 
universal, humanist visiong when she identifies the Black women's struggles as a 
"a part of a wider struggle for human dignity and development" (1991: 37). What 
is crucial for an ensuing liberatory stand is the revelation of new sources of 
knowledge for the oppressed, and also the exploration of new ways of knowing. 
Black women, Collins (1991: 202) argues, need to use Meren t  sources, 
"alternative sites such as music, literature, daily conversations, and everyday 
behavior as important locations for articulating the core themes of a m lack 
Collins develops an interesting distinction between knowledge and wisdom, with 
experience a s  the cutting edge dividing them. Wisdom is what the oppressed need and have to 
survive the oppression they undergo: "Knowledge without wisdom is adequate for the powerful, 
but wisdom is essential to the survival of the subordinate" (Collins 1991: 208). 
feminist consciousness." Ultimately, what Collins advocates is a multiplicity of 
visions similar to the one Elsa Barkley Brown (1989: 921) presents as enveloping 
"a variety of experiences, a variety of ways of understanding the world, a variety 
of frameworks of operation, without imposing consciously or unconsciously a notion 
of the norm." 
Yet, once more, even as we expand gender oppression to include race and 
class, what we are presented with is a desire for the future, a longing for a 
multiplicity of voices. This objective does not then translate into an attempt to 
identify the processes and institutions that would specifically enhance or curb such 
a multi-vocal expression. How can we secure the multiple sites of experience once 
-we have identified .them? Rlack feminists also do-not adequately answer.this 
question. Weewould argue that we.can gain significant insights into this 
problematic by analyzing yet another site of experience, that emerging from the 
Western colonial oppression.of the Third-world by the West. Such an analysis can 
alert. us to the complexity and the tenacious persistence of oppression. 
From the Women's Experience to the Third World: Edward Said and 
Subaltern Studies 
Third-World critiques of Western oppression demonstrate how difficult it is 
to eradicate oppression even after one successfully identifies it. Edward Said 
(1978, 1983, 1992) in particular portrays the tenacity with which the West still 
maintains the oppression of the Third-world which it started in the seventeenth 
century. He argues that even when one identifies and analyzes this Western . . .  
hegemony, one still cannot reduce it, let alone eliminate it. Instead, by doing so, 
one unwittingly often partakes in the reproduction of the hegemony. There is a 
lesson to be drawn from this observation for a new interpretation of historical 
materialism: in addition to locating and identifying the nature of oppression, we 
need to trace it to its social structural origins to expose its ties with the rest of 
society. Third-World critiques thus alert us how culture and social structure 
interact to reproduce the hegemony of the West. What differentiates Western 
oppression from class, gender, race oppression is that the historical conditions 
which produced it have been extensively analyzed in Said's works through the 
concept of Orientalism, a concept which historical depicts the complex process 
through which, and the tenacity with which Western oppression diffuses to the 
rest of the world, and, in the process, also reproduces itself. 
Edward Said and the Politics of Western Oppression Said's current 
conception of Orientalism is located, like the scientific discourse, in late eighteenth 
:n:.- =.I*. 
century Enlightenment. He argues that (1978: 3) 
as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient -- dealing with 
it, making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, 
by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a 
Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority 
over the Orient ...( W)ithout examining Orientalism as a discourse one 
cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by 
which European culture was able to manage -- and even produce -- 
the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment 
period. 
What is of particular significance in this quote for our purposes is the emphasis on 
the complexity of the mode of oppression and domination. Said continuously 
reiterates (1978: 6), throughout his narrative, the unique resilience of Orientalist 
discourse, "(its) sheer knitted-together strength ..., its very close ties to the 
enabling socio-economic and political institutions, and its redoubtable 
durability. " lo Once formed, Orientalism penetrates into all aspects and 
dimensions of human existence. It is through the articulation of this point can we 
lo After all, Said continues, "any system of ideas that can remain unchanged from the 
period of Ernest Renan in the 1840s until the present in the United States must be something 
more formidable than a mere collection of lies. Orientalism ... is a created body of theory and 
practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material investment." 
gain insights 'into the obstacles that the dominant groups would produce to quench 
the multiple sites of experience. Said argues that (1978: 7): 
'Under the general heading of knowledge of the orient, and within the 
umbrella of Western hegemony over the Orient during the period 
from the end of the eighteenth century, there emerged a complex 
Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, 
for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in 
anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses 
about mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and 
sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, 
religious and national character. 
As Western oppression spreads through the entire social system like a giant wave, 
it affects all aspects of the human experience. What makes Western oppression in 
the form of Orientalism teilacious is its diffusion into the pores of society. By 
. . analyzing .the mode of this difiusion, we.can gain. insights into the origins of the 
, . multiple. sites of oppression:that exist-in contemporary society. Said notes (1978: 
12) that 
(Olrientalism.. .(is) a distribution of geopolitical awareness into 
,aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philological 
texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical 
distinction ... but also of a whole series of "interests" which, by such 
means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological 
analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but 
also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention 
to understand, in some cases to  control, manipulate, even to 
incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) 
world.. . Indeed, my real arguinent is that Orientalism is.. .a 
considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as 
such has less to do with the Orient than it does with "our" world. 
Once made aware of the tenacious hold of the complex forms of oppression over us, 
Said then explicates the complexity of the historical process of disempowerment, 
and, once disempowered, of the immense difficulties one encounters in restoring 
agency. The mode in which this oppression reproduces itself is particularly 
noteworthy: the oppressed themselves accept the Orientalist categories as truths 
about themselves and uphold it in the name of indigenous nationalism. We can 
easily draw parallels to how class, gender, race oppression have similar complex, 
diffuse, tenacious roots in the social structure that need to be disclosed. 
What, then, does Said suggest to  resist, to counter this oppression? I t  is only 
in his most recent work that Said starts to  articulate the concept of resistance. He 
argues that (1993: xii): 
Yet i t  was the case nearly everywhere in the non-European world 
that the coming of the white man brought forth some sort of 
resistance ... Along with armed resistance in places as diverse as 
nineteenth-century Algeria, Ireland, and Indonesia, there also went 
considerable efforts in cultural resistance almost everywhere, the 
assertion of nationalist identities, and, in the political realm, the 
creation of associations and parties whose common goal was self- 
determination and national independence. Never was it the case that 
the imperial encounter pitted an active Western intruder against a 
supine or inert non-Western native; there was always some form of 
active resistance, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, the 
; resistance finally won out. 
Yet how, as a sociologist, can we empirically reach the sites of this resistance? 
Said suggests the use of stories (1993: xii-xiii) which are "at the heart of what 
explorers and novelists say about strange regions of the world; they also become 
the method colonized people use to assert their own identity and the existence of 
the$ own history." Yet he then proceeds to argue that the illustration which 
emerges from such an empirical analysis is a gloomy and often discouraging one, 
one that often is unable to escape the cycle of Western oppression. When thinking 
about a possible venue for social liberation, Said joins the aspirations of Dorothy 
Smith, Sandra Harding and Patricia Collins as he argues that what tempers this 
oppression is the possible "emergence of a new intellectual and political 
conscience" (1993: xxiv) that challenges generalizations and binary oppositions, 
and advocates viewing society and power relations in a more historical, processual, 
and critical mode. Although Said meticulously documents how oppression becomes 
culturally constructed, we are, once more, left with hopes, introspection, and self- 
criticism. 11 
Subaltern Studies and the Politics of Colonial Repression The 
empirical analyses undertaken by subaltern studies provide us with the only 
insight into how to proceed in restoring the agency of the oppressed. Sen (1987: 
203-4) defines subaltern as a term used to "denote the entire people that is 
subordinate in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office, or in any other way." 
Hence we are provided, for the first time, with a concept that expands the 
oppressed beyond the boundaries of class, gender, race and region. By then 
studying the creation and 1-eproduction of Western colonial domination in India, 
the subalternists delve into -the. multiple -levels of' consciousness ,through which 
.. oppression implants itself. 
The first en~ancipatory act that they provide is "to restore to subaltern 
groups their historical being" (Das 1989: 3 14). Once the colonized subject is 
analyzed more in terms of its multiple confrontations with the colonial power, and 
once these confrontations are defined in.terms of the synibol systems of the 
colonized rather than the colonizer, then and only then, the subalternist Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak argues (1987: 197), "is the agency of change located in the 
insurgent or the subaltern." It is thus through this concurrent assessment of the 
standpoints of the colonizer and the colonized that subalternists approach 
oppression. The empirical model that they provide for such an approach seems to 
be mostly the textual reinterpretation of the colonial discourse. As Chatterjee 
articulates (1983: 310) 
l1 Richard Fox (1992: 146), in his critique of Said, argues that  Said's account "remains a 
history of Orientalism from the West and affirms in the very way it is set  out the categories of 
West and East  i t  ostensibly attacks. It also does not allow the possibility that  Orientals, once 
Orientalized by Western domination, could use Orientalism itself against tha t  domination." 
(1)n so far as that knowledge (on economic and political conditions) 
has a history, the gaps have a history too. In fact it was the same 
history that produced both the knowledge -- enshrined in archival 
documents -- and the gaps which the same documents also contain. 
Hence, we are alerted to search for and interpret the silences in the texts, the 
silences that often contain the agency of the colonized. This subaltern 
reinterpretation of oppression through an empirical textual analysis of the 
multiple sites of the confrontation between the colonizer and the colonized leads us . 
to  the possible solutions to the structure/agency problem. In countering the 
structuralist interpretation of historical materialism, most of the scholars we have 
analyzed suggest a textual reinterpretation, a mode of analysis advocated by 
postmodernism. 
Hence, a t  this juncture we can start to explore the possible theoretical 
solutions in restoring the agency of the oppressed and in preserving their multiple 
sites of experience. Postmodernism and a new historical materialism that 
redefines social structure emerges as the only viable possible solutions t o  this 
problem. 
Solution I: Postmodernism and Relativity in Oppression 
The fundamental dichotomies of the Enlightenment thought, dichotomies 
such as rationaliirrational, subjectlobject provide the epistemological basis of the 
postmodern critique (Hekman 1990: 1-2). Postmodernists argue that these 
dichotomies chose a rational, objective formulation over the rest of human 
experience and then legitimated this choice under the rubric of science. By 
making such a choice, however, this formulation favored the experience of the 
social groups which created and supported it at the expense of all the others it 
marginalized. Using the postmodern approach, Susan Bordo demonstrates, for 
instance, how women's agency was destroyed by the Cartesian thought that 
formed the epistemological foundation of the current social sciences. She studies 
25 
(1987: 247-8) Descartes's Meditations to demonstrate the instability, the dark 
underside to the "bold rationalist vision ... based on clarity, dispassion, and 
detachment." According to her, the great Cartesian anxiety that emerges is due 
the drastic Enlightenment separation from the organic female universe of the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The Cartesian reconstruction of the world 
during the Enlightenment is'thus a defiant gesture of independence from the 
female cosmos. Yet, as Bordo denlonstrates, and as we can surmise today, this 
independence from the "female," the "natural" comes at  a great cost. The mutual 
opposition of the spiritual and the corporeal replaces reason with belief and turns 
the formerly female earth into "inert, dead, mechanically interacting 
matter.. .Emphatic, associational, or emotional response (is seen as obscuring) 
- objectivity, .feeling for nature (is perceived as muddying) the clear lake of the 
mind" (Bordo 1987: 260-1). Current scientific thought, by embracing the rational 
method, ,dehumanizes the subjects and abandons the complex, the passionate, and 
the caring as "unscientific. " 
- The textual analyses that postmodernisn~ engages in do indeed capture the 
complexity of human experience and also do successfully locate the silences. Yet, 
even though it presents a well-placed critique of existing epistemologies, 
postmodernism still fails to come up with an alternative formulation. Since it 
argues that power diffuses into society through texts to fragment and particularize 
social relationships, all our concepts become problematized and to appear in 
quotes, as does "oppression." If we take this theoretical position to its conclusion, 
however, all oppression becomes relative and incomparable. This article argues 
that the postmodern explanation of the discursive processes by which humans gain 
understanding of their world is therefore necessary for sociological analysis, but 
not sufficient. Such a discursive approach alerts us to the interaction of 
experience, action and structure, but, a t  the same time, privileges the perspective 
of the scholar doing the explanatioa. The conscious theoretical stand of not 
replacing the discarded Enlightenment epistemology with another one eliminates 
the hegemony of objectivity but, in doing so, unfortunately introduces the larger 
problem of relativity immobilizes our capacity to challenge the existing power 
hegemonies in society. 
Postmodernism privileges those that already have power in society, those 
who are, in the contemporary world, located in the West. Third-world criticisnls of 
postmodernism starkly illustrate the missing analysis of power relationships. As 
Samir Amin points out (1989: 153) 
The view that any person has the right -- and even the power -- to 
judge others is replaced by attention to the relativity of those 
judgements. Without a doubt, such judgements can be erroneous, 
superficial, hasty, or relative. No case is ever definitely closed; debate 
always continues. But that is precisely the point. It is necessary to 
pursue debate and not to avoid it on the grounds that the views that 
anyone forms about others are and always will be false ...( t)he claim is 
made that only Europeans can truly understand Europe, Chinese 
China, Christians Christianity, and Moslems Islam; the Eurocentrism 
of one group is completed by the inverted Eurocentrism of others. 
Hence postmodernism inadvertently reproduces oppression. One can take Amin's 
point even further to argue that this "inverted Eurocentrism" not only leads to  
oppression within the Third-world, but also reproduces and sustains the current 
world status quo that favors the West. Postmodernism thus becomes a 
conservative ideology that purposefully identifies and reproduces the existing 
power structure. 
Solution 11: A New Historical Materialism 
A new interpretation of historical materialism can provide us with a 
possible venue to study the experience of the oppressed. We can combine class, 
gender, race, and Western oppression into a single category of oppression, and 
redefine, through the concept of reflexivity, the connection between the subject's 
experience of the social structure and the Marxist conception of the structure ' 
itself. Structuration theory provides an extensive discussion of the complex 
relationship human agency, social action and social structure (see, in particular, 
Giddens 1984, 1976), effectively eliminating the rigid causal dichotomy l2 between 
structure and agency. According t o  Anthony Giddens (1976: 121), the nature of 
human agency is such that it both constitutes social structure and is, a t  the same 
time, the medium of this constitution. Succinctly put, every act of production is 
also an act of reproduction: human agency itself is reflexively and recursively 
implicated in social structure. The theoretical boundaries among experience, 
action and structure erode when we reread Giddens's (1984: 25) fbllowing 
- . depiction.of .agents, and structures: 
$ a  The-,constitution of agents and structures larenot two independently 
given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. 
According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural 
properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the 
-practices they recursively organize. Structure is not "external" to the 
individuals. 
It is this .complex interconnectedness which can theoretically enrich the notion of 
subject's experience to include both .domination and resistance. In Giddens's 
structuration theory (Thompson 1989: 59), unacknowledged conditions and the 
unintended consequences of action influence one another through reflexive 
monitoring, rationalization and motivation of action. Applied to  the subject's 
l2 Note how similar the following statement by Giddens (1989: 296) on the nature of 
"scientific" research is similar to Smith's criticism of a sociology hegemonized by male-centric 
"objective" facts: 
(F)or instance, it is a logical feature of social research ... that all research endeavors 
have an ethnographic or "anthropological" aspect to them. Since this is a logical 
point, by definition it does not disclose anything directly which is an  option for a 
researcher; it sets out what all social investigation, without exception, involves. 
Yet it would be wrong to say that it is without direct relevance to the conduct and 
interpretation of research. Thus someone who believes she or he is dealing only 
with "hard facts" ... might both misconstrue what those "facts" are and other 
conclusions drawn from them, if the point is ignored. 
experience, this theoretical interpretation implies that the totality of the 
experience can only be captured by going from the standpoint of the experience to -- 
structure and back to the subject's experience of the structure. 
Subject's Experience as a Liberatory Struggle Against Oppression 
This new interpretation of historical materialism brings in the subject's experience 
to recapture the human agency. I t  then introduces the concept of reflexivity to 
reach the experience of all oppressed groups through and in spite of the social 
structure. Only then can historical materialism capture the contradictory tensions 
of domination/resistance, only then can we can understand why oppression persists 
throughout the world, and only then can we come up with a successful liberatory 
model against oppression. Yet, this article is obviously just the beginning of such 
a theoretical endeavor. 
At this juncture, we cannot produce any conclusions beyond the visions of 
two standpoint theorists, Sandra Harding and Nancy Hartsock; on where such 
reflexivity could possibly lead us. On the one hand, Sandra Harding discusses the 
new vision of this reflexivity can produce. She argues that (1991: 163): 
A notion of strong reflexivity would require that the objects of inquiry 
be conceptualized as gazing back in all their cultural particularity and 
that the researcher, through theory and methods, stand behind them, 
gazing back a t  his own socially situated research project in all its 
cultural particularity and its relationships to other projects of his 
culture -- many of which ... can be seen only from locations far away 
from the scientist's actual daily work. 
On the other hand, Nancy Hartsock provides an insight into how to recover the 
entire (rather than male) spectrum of the subject's experience of oppression (1987: 
The feminist standpoint which emerges through an examination of 
women's activities is related to the proletarian standpoint, but deeper 
going. Women and workers inhabit a world in which the emphasis is 
on change rather than stasis, a world characterized by interaction 
with natural substances rather than separation from nature, a world 
in which quality is more important than quantity, a world in which 
the unification of mind and body is inherent in the activities 
performed. Yet, there are some important differences, differences 
marked by the fact that the proletarian (if male) is immersed in this 
world only during the time his labor power is used by the capitalist. 
If, to paraphrase Marx, we follow the worker home from the factory, 
we can once again perceive a change in the dramatis personae. He 
who before followed behind as the worker, timid and holding back, 
with nothing to expect but a hiding, now strides in front while a third 
person, not specifically present in Marx's account of the transaction 
between capitalist and worker (both of whom are male) follows 
timidly behind, carrying groceries, baby, and diapers. 
This portrayal captures the different trajectories of experience men and women 
often go through which our new interpretation possibly captures through its 
reflexive mode. 
In concluding the possible ways through which to map out this new 
interpretation, we are left with Hillary Rose's (1987: 265) call for once more 
.bringing together, in scholarly research, "the hand, brain, and the heart," as Marx 
, , .and Engels once did a.century ago. Only-then can we reach a new scientific 
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